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Optimizing traffic flow is essential for easing congestion. However, even when globally-optimal,
coordinated and individualized routes are provided, users may choose alternative routes which of-
fer lower individual costs. By analyzing the impact of selfish route-choices on performance using
the cavity method, we find that a small ratio of selfish route-choices improves the global perfor-
mance of uncoordinated transportation networks, but degrades the efficiency of optimized systems.
Remarkably, compliant users always gain in the former and selfish users may gain in the latter,
under some parameter conditions. The theoretical results are in good agreement with large-scale
simulations. Iterative route-switching by a small fraction of selfish users leads to Nash equilibria
close to the globally optimal routing solution. Our theoretical framework also generalizes the use
of the cavity method, originally developed for the study of equilibrium states, to analyze iterative
game-theoretical problems. These results shed light on the feasibility of easing congestion by route
coordination when not all vehicles follow the coordinated routes.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.20.-y, 89.20.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic congestion is a major problem facing both
metropolitan and highway road networks, which incurs
high environmental and economic costs. While the eco-
nomic costs on their own are mind-boggling ($166Bn for
the US in 2018 [1]), the environmental costs through
CO2 emissions on climate change, and of fine particu-
late matter (PM2.5), nitrogen dioxide (NOx) and ozone,
O3 on public health are as significant (these three air
pollutants alone are responsible for 400,000 premature
deaths per year in the EU [2]). However, easing con-
gestion through additional investment in infrastructure
incurs its own momentary and environmental costs and
one of the alternatives to mitigating congestion is traf-
fic optimization through coordination [3], supported by
advances in information technology [4] and potentially
the penetration of autonomous vehicles [5]. While op-
timization algorithms for coordinating individual trans-
portation routes to achieve a global objective [6–9] show
the global benefits, at the expense of a small increase
in average path length of individual users [10, 11], it is
clear that affecting road-user behavior is the key to their
success [12, 13].
Even when optimally coordinated individual routes are
recommended, some road-users may choose alternative
routes that incur lower individual costs for them. Dy-
namical selfish routing has been studied using game the-
ory and operations research methodologies [14, 15], re-
vealing the economic incentives which can suppress self-
∗chyeung@eduhk.hk
ish behaviors [16] as well as the Nash equilibria in capac-
itated networks [17]. While most of these studies focused
on the dynamics of individual route decisions, the impact
of selfish routing decisions on previously optimized trans-
portation network has not yet been explored. Such anal-
ysis is of particular importance as it helps evaluate the
potential benefit brought by global route coordination
in future intelligent transportation system, via advanced
information technology or self-driving vehicles.
Here, we introduce a transportation network model
where users are given globally optimized individual
routes from their start point to a common end point
(e.g., city center or metropolitan hub), but some choose
not to follow the recommended path but minimize their
own cost. We apply the cavity approach developed for
the studies of spin glasses [18] to compute the re-routing
probability by the selfish users and reveal their impact
on the system globally. Both analysis and simulations
demonstrate the benefit, for the individual, of following
the optimized suggestions. When selfish users are allowed
to switch routes multiple times, the obtained solutions
approach Nash equilibria. Finally, we simulate the model
on the England highway network, where behaviors simi-
lar to those observed in random regular graphs and cap-
tured by the analytical predictions are observed. Our re-
sults reveal the impact of individual route choices on the
global cost and the benefit in having coordinated routing
in transportation networks even when some road-users do
not follow the recommended routes. We also demonstrate
how the cavity method, which was devised for studying
equilibrium states, can be generalized to study iterative
game-theoretical problems.
The paper is organized as follows: we will explain the
problem and the corresponding model in Sec. II and out-
line the derivation of the solution in Sec. III. In Sec. IV
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2we show the results obtained in synthetic and realistic
network scenarios and examine numerically the impact
of selfish decisions on the performance of the transporta-
tion system as a whole, as well as of selfish and compliant
users. Summary and conclusions are presented in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
Consider M vehicles denoted by ν = 1, . . . ,M trav-
eling on a transportation network of N nodes denoted
by i = 1, . . . , N . The density of vehicles is denoted by
α = M/N . Each vehicle ν starts from a random origin
node Oν , and travels to a common and randomly drawn
destination node D. We denote the route of vehicle ν
on the link between nodes i and j by a variable σνij as
follows,
σνij =

1, ν travels from i→j
−1, ν travels from j→ i
0, if ν does not travel between i and j,
(1)
such that σνji = −σνij . The total traffic flow from node
i to j is |Iij | =
∑
ν |σνij |. Since traffic congestion oc-
curs when more vehicles share the same road, one aims
to minimize path-overlaps to suppress congestion. We
therefore introduce the social travel cost
H(σ|γ) = 1
M
∑
(ij)
(∑
ν
|σνij |
)γ
=
1
M
∑
(ij)
|Iij |γ , (2)
where γ > 1 and the cost increases non-linearly with the
traffic flow to discourage the sharing of a link by multi-
ple vehicles (other nonlinear costs can be accommodated
within the same framework), (ij) denotes the un-ordered
combination of i, j, and the bold symbol σ = {σνij}ν,i,j
denotes the vector over the variable σνij . For γ = 1, there
is no interaction between routes and users merely mini-
mize the length of their own routes irrespective of traffic
H(σ|γ = 1) = 1
M
∑
ν
(∑
(ij)
|σνij |
)
. (3)
To minimize H(σ|γ) with γ > 0, vehicles traveling on
the same link always head in the same direction [9], i.e.
either σνij ≥ 0 or σνij ≤ 0 for all ν on the link i→ j, and
the directed traffic flow between node i and j is given by
Iij =
∑
ν
σνij , (4)
such that vehicles go from i to j if Iij > 0 and vice
versa. The route configuration which minimizes H(σ|γ)
in Eq. (2) is found using a message-passing algorithm [9].
Since our primary goal is to study the impact of selfish
routing decisions on previously optimized transportation
network, here we study a scenario in which the social
travel cost H(σ|γ) has already been minimized, and the
corresponding optimized route for each vehicle ν is iden-
tified and recommended. We denote the optimized route
for vehicle ν by σν∗ij = 1 if it includes travel from node i
to j, and σν∗ij = 0 otherwise, where σ
∗ is,
σ∗ = argmin
σ
H(σ|γ), (5)
Hence, the total recommended traffic from node i to j is
denoted by I∗ij =
∑
ν σ
ν∗
ij . We then consider a fraction
fs of the M users to be selfish. A selfish user ν follows
the route σ˜ν that minimizes its own cost, defined as the
impact of traffic on their own route - the individual travel
cost
Cν(σ˜ν |σ∗, γ) =
∑
i,j
|σ˜νij |
(
1 + |I∗ij − σν∗ij |
)γ−1
. (6)
It implies that user ν is aware of the (recommended)
traffic induced by other vehicles in the network |I∗ij−σν∗ij |
and use it to minimize its overlap with the traffic. The
cost nonlinearity γ−1 originates from the need to equate
the sum of individual costs and the social cost of Eq. (2)
as explained below. For γ = 2 the individual cost reflect
the cumulative traffic flow experienced by an individual
over the chosen route.
This definition (6) leads to an interesting relationship
between the social H in Eq. (2) and individual travel
costs Cν . We note that when all vehicles follow the rec-
ommended path, i.e. σ˜νij = σ
ν∗
ij for all ν and i, j, the
summand in Eq. (6) is given by
|σν∗ij |
(
1 + |I∗ij−σν∗ij |
)γ−1
=
{
|I∗ij |γ−1, when |σν∗ij |=1,
0, when |σν∗ij |=0,
(7)
such that |σν∗ij |
(
1 + |I∗ij − σν∗ij |
)γ−1
= |σν∗ij ||I∗ij |γ−1 and
the sum of all individual travel costs is given by∑
ν
Cν(σν∗|σ∗, γ)=
∑
ν
∑
i,j
|σν∗ij ||I∗ij |γ−1 =
∑
i,j
|I∗ij |γ , (8)
which is the social travel cost H. This relation implies
that if all users follow the recommended routes, the sum
of their individual costs is the same as the optimal so-
cial cost. However, if some users do not follow the rec-
ommended routes, the social travel cost can only remain
unchanged or increase, since the recommended path con-
figuration already minimizes the social cost.
To quantify the impact of selfish decisions on the social
travel cost, we measure the fractional change in H due
to re-routing by selfish users
∆H(γr, γ) = H(σ˜
∗(γr)|γ)−H(σ∗(γr)|γ)
H(σ∗(γr)|γ) (9)
where σ∗(γr) is the configuration of path recommended
to the users which minimizes H(σ|γr); however, the real
travel cost is characterized by H(σ|γ) where γ is not
necessarily equal to γr. On the other hand, the vari-
ables σ˜∗(γr) denote the configuration of routes after self-
ish users have re-routed from the recommended σ∗(γr)
3to optimize their individual cost C(σ˜∗|σ∗, γ). In other
words, σ˜∗(γr) = {σ˜ν∗(γr)}ν=1,...,M and σ˜ν∗(γr) for ve-
hicle ν is given by
σ˜ν∗(γr) (10)
=
{
σν∗(γr), for compliant users,
argminσ˜ν Cν(σ˜ν |σ∗(γr), γ), for selfish users.
In this paper, we reveal the impact of selfish route
decisions by examining the quantity ∆H(γr, γ), as well as
similar quantities defined for both selfish and compliant
users separately. Although our theoretical derivations in
Sec. III can accommodate all γr, γ ≥ 1 in ∆H(γr, γ), we
will focus our studies on two scenarios, namely
1. the case with (γr, γ) = (1, 2), i.e. when all users
are originally recommended to follow their short-
est path σ∗(1), i.e. γr = 1, but the social and
individual costs are characterized by H(σ|2) and
C(σ˜∗|σ∗(1), 2) respectively, both with γ = 2 to dis-
courage link-sharing by multiple vehicles;
2. the case with (γr, γ) = (2, 2), i.e. the original con-
figuration of recommended path already minimizes
the social cost H(σ|2), but selfish users re-route
to a path σ˜ν 6= σ∗(2) to minimize their own cost
C(σ˜ν |σ∗(2), 2); the re-routing could potentially in-
crease the social cost as suggested by the rela-
tion Eq. (8).
III. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
We employ tools used in the study of spin-glass systems
to compute the switching probability of selfish users on
a link, which is used for the computation of ∆H(γr, γ)
in Eq. (9). In Sec. III A, we first describe the approach
developed in [9] which gives the analytical solution of the
system minimizing the social travel cost H. In Sec. III B,
we follow a similar framework to derive a new analytic
approach to describe the re-routing behavior of selfish
users.
A. Optimization of the social travel cost H
We first describe the framework developed in [9] to
map a route optimization problem into a problem of re-
source allocation. In this case, we assign a transportation
load Λi to each node i, such that
Λi =

1, if i = Oν ,∃ν;
−∞, if i = D;
0, otherwise.
(11)
To ensure a path to the common destination is identified
for each vehicle, each of them transfers the (unit) load
from their origin to a common destination, which serves
as a sink. In this case, we restrict all traffic flows to take
up integer values, and the net resources Ri on each node
i (except the destination) to be conserved as follows
Ri = Λi +
∑
j∈Ni
Iji = 0 (12)
where Ni is the set of neighboring nodes of i.
We then employ the cavity approach [18] and assume
that for the sparsely-connected networks studied only
large loops exist, such that neighbors of node i become
statistically independent if it is being removed. At zero
temperature, we express the optimized energy Ei→l(Iil)
of a tree network terminated at node i as a function of the
traffic flow Iil from i to l. Next, we write down a recur-
sion relation to relate Ei→l(Iil) to the energy Ej→i(Iji)
of its neighbors j other than l [9], given by
Ei→l(Iil) = min{{Iji}|Ri=0}
[
|Iil|γ+
∑
j∈Ni\l
Ej→i(Iji)
]
. (13)
We further note that Ei→l(Iil) is an extensive quantity
of which the value of energy is dependent on the number
of nodes in the network; we therefore define an intensive
quantity EVi→l(Iil) as
EVi→l(Iil) = Ei→l(Iil)− Ei→l(0) (14)
To obtain the analytical results of the system, we
have to solve for the functional probability distribution
P [EV (I)]. By using the recursion relation in Eq. (13), we
can write a self-consistent equation in terms of P [EV (I)],
by summing over all degrees k, in the form
P [EV (I)]=
∫
dk
P (k)k
〈k〉
∫
dΛdΛ
k−1∏
j=1
∫
dEVj P [E
V
j (I)]
× δ
(
EV (I)−R14[{EVj },Λ, I]
)
(15)
where R14 denotes the right hand side of Eq. (14),
which indeed has to be computed by the recursion re-
lation Eq. (13); P (k) and 〈k〉 represent the degree dis-
tribution and its average, respectively. The analytical
results obtained by numerically solving Eq. (15) can be
found in [9]. In addition to providing analytical results
for the routing system macroscopically, Eq. (13) can be
used as an optimization algorithm to identify individual-
ized optimal path configurations microscopically in real
instances.
B. Analysis of selfish re-routing behavior
To analyze the impact of re-routing by the selfish ve-
hicles, we single out a vehicle µ and analyze its re-
routing behavior from the path configuration identified
by Eq. (13). In this case, we denote the resources on
node i by Λi = (Λ
µ
i ,Λ
\µ
i ), such that Λ
µ
i and Λ
\µ
i denote
4the transportation load for vehicle µ and any other user
respectively. Similar to Eq. (11), Λi given by
Λi =

(1, 0), if i = Oµ;
(0, 1), if i = Oν ,∃ν 6= µ;
(−∞,−∞), if i = D;
(0, 0), otherwise.
(16)
We further define the net resources on node i to be Ri =
(Rµi , R
\µ
i ), such that
Rµi = Λ
µ
i +
∑
j∈Ni
σµji, (17)
R
\µ
i = Λ
\µ
i +
∑
j∈Ni
I
\µ
ji , (18)
where Rµi and R
\µ
i denote the net resources for vehicle µ
and for the other users, while σµji and I
\µ
ji denote the flow
of vehicle µ and the rest of the traffic. To ensure each
vehicle has a path to the common destination, we restrict
all flows to take up integer values and (Rµi , R
\µ
i ) = (0, 0).
Here, we analyze a scenario in which the path config-
uration that optimizes the social travel cost H(σ|γr) is
computed and known to all users; µ then re-routes to
optimize its individual cost Cµ(σ˜µ|σ∗, γ) based on the
traffic in the recommended configuration. To achieve the
goal, similar to Sec. III A, we define the optimized energy
Ei→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il ) of the tree network terminated at node i to
be a function of the traffic flow characterized by σµil and
I
\µ
il from i to l. The rationale for introducing this energy
is to separate the contribution of user µ on link i → l
from the remaining traffic. We then write an equation
relating Ei→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il ) to Ej→i(σ
µ
ji, I
\µ
ji ) from all neigh-
boring node j ∈ Ni of node i excluding node l, given
by
Ei→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il ) = (19)
min
{σµji,I\µji |Ri=(0,0)}
(|σµil|+|I\µil |)γr+ ∑
j∈Ni\l
Ej→i(σ
µ
ji, I
\µ
ji )
 ,
where the exponent γr is adopted in the optimized path
configuration identified and recommended to the users.
To characterize the re-routing by vehicle µ, we intro-
duce another energy E˜i→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il ), that considers
the replacement of the recommended edge variable σµ∗il
by the selfishly-optimized σ˜µil, where I
\µ∗
il corresponds to
the traffic resulting from the optimized paths for all other
users, which minimize H(σ|γr). By using Eq. (19), given
a set of (σµ∗il , I
\µ∗
il ), one can express the corresponding
optimal (σµ∗ji , I
\µ∗
ji ) from the neighboring node j of node
i excluding node l by
{σµ∗ji , I\µ∗ji }j∈Ni\l = (20)
argmin
{σµji,I
\µ
ji |Ri=(0,0)}
(|σµ∗il |+|I\µ∗il |)γr+ ∑
j∈Ni\l
Ej→i(σ
µ
ji, I
\µ
ji )
 ,
l
i
j
σµil, I
\µ
il
Ei→l
(
σµil, I
\µ
il
)
b b b
Ej→i
(
σµji, I
\µ
ji
)
σµji, I
\µ
ji
l
i
j b b b
{σµ∗ji , Iµ∗ji }j∈Ni\l
obtain:
E˜j→i(σ˜
µ
ji, σ
µ∗
ji , I
\µ∗
ji )
E˜i→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il )
σ˜µil, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il
Eq.(19) Eq.(21)
Eq.(20)
σ˜µji, σ
µ∗
ji , I
\µ∗
ji
FIG. 1: A schematic diagram showing the recursion relation
in Eqs. (19) - (21), and the dependence of (21) on (19). The
recursion relation is iterated simultaneously for all nodes to
obtain the joint functional distribution P [EV , E˜V ].
which is similar to Eq. (13) except for the separation
of user µ. Thus, the values of (σµ∗ji , I
\µ∗
ji ) are indeed de-
pendent on (σµ∗il , I
\µ∗
il ) and have already been computed
in Eq. (19). By using this relation, one can similarly write
an equation to relate the energy E˜i→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il ),
where the recommended path σµ∗il has been replaced
by the selfishly-optimized σ˜µil, to E˜j→i(σ˜
µ
ji, σ
µ∗
ji , I
\µ∗
ji ) for
j ∈ Ni \ l, given by
E˜i→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il ) = (21)
min
{{σ˜µji}|R
µ
i=0}
|σ˜µil|(1+|I\µ∗il |)γ−1+∑
j∈Ni\l
E˜j→i(σ˜
µ
ji, σ
µ∗
ji , I
\µ∗
ji )
 .
We note that the exponent γ, instead γr, is used in com-
puting the above individual cost. For clarity of presenta-
tion, we omit the dependence of (σµ∗ji , I
\µ∗
ji ) on (σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il )
in Eq. (21).
In summary: The message passing process is described
in Fig. 1. i) We use Eq. (19) to minimize the social travel
cost H(σ|γr) for all users. ii) The corresponding optimal
configuration of (σµ∗ji , I
\µ∗
ji ) from all neighbors j for spe-
cific values (σµ∗il , I
\µ∗
il ) is given by Eq. (20). iii) This
information is used to compute E˜ using Eq. (21), which
is the optimized individual cost for vehicle µ. Similar
to Eq. (14), we define the corresponding intensive quan-
tities for E and E˜ as
EVi→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il ) = Ei→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il )−Ei→l(0, 0), (22)
E˜Vi→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il )
= E˜i→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ∗
il , I
\µ∗
il )−E˜(0, 0, 0), (23)
To compute EV and E˜V in the above equations, one
has to iteratively follow the constrained optimization in
Eqs. (19) - (21).
To obtain the analytical solution of the re-
routing behavior of vehicle µ, we have to find
the joint functional probability distribution
P [EV (σµ, I\µ), E˜V (σ˜µ, σµ∗, I\µ∗)]; in the subsequent
5derivation, we denote this functional probability distri-
bution as P [EV , E˜V ], omitting the arguments of EV
and E˜V for clarity. In this case, we have to utilize
both Eqs. (19) and (21) to write down a self-consistent
equation in terms of P [EV , E˜V ], given by
P [EV , E˜V ] =
∫
dk
P (k)k
〈k〉
∫
dΛdΛ
×
k−1∏
j=1
∫
dEVj dE˜
V
j P [E
V
j , E˜
V
j ]
× δ
(
EV (σµ, I\µ)−R22[{EVj },Λ, σµ, I\µ]
)
× δ
(
E˜V (σ˜µ, σµ∗, I\µ∗)−R23[{E˜Vj },Λ, σ˜µ, σµ∗, I\µ∗]
)
,
(24)
where R22 and R23 correspond to the right hand side of
the recursion relations in Eqs. (22) and (23) respectively.
Equation (24) can be solved numerically for P [EV , E˜V ].
1. The probability of re-routing
To derive various physical quantities of interest, we
first compute the probability p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗), of vehicle µ
re-routing from the original recommended traffic σµ∗ on
a specific link to σ˜µ∗. For instance, p(0, 1, 3) stands for
the probability of vehicle µ switching its path away from
a link with total traffic equal 3, which was part of the
original optimized and recommended route. With the
obtained joint probability P [EV , E˜V ], the expression for
p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗) is given by
p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗) =∫
dEV1 dE˜
V
1 P [E
V
1 , E˜
V
1 ]
∫
dEV2 dE˜
V
2 P [E
V
2 , E˜
V
2 ]
∑
I\µ∗
× δ
(
(σµ∗, I\µ∗)
− argmin
(σ,I)
[
EV1 (σ, I) + E
V
2 (−σ,−I)− |σ + I|γr
])
× δ
(
I∗ − (σµ∗ + I\µ∗)
)
× δ
(
σ˜µ∗ − argmin
σ˜
[
E˜V1 (σ˜,σ
µ∗,I\µ∗)
+ E˜V2 (−σ˜,−σµ∗,−I\µ∗)− |σ˜||1 + I\µ∗|γ−1
])
,
(25)
which relies on evaluating the energy changes linked to
the specified route switching.
2. The cost of re-routing one selfish user
By marginalizing over the joint probability
p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗), we obtain P (I∗), the probability
that the original recommended traffic on a link is I∗,
P (I∗) =
∑
σ˜µ∗,σµ∗
p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗) (26)
We can then compute the optimal social travel cost
H(σ∗(γr)|γ) of the original system with recommended
routes σ∗(γr) by
H(σ∗(γr)|γ) =
∑
I∗
P (I∗)|I∗|γ , (27)
where σ∗(γr) and I∗ are computed with respect to γr
by Eq. (25) based on the recursion relation of Eq. (19),
while the exponent γ reflects the fact that one computes
the social cost of (2). Similarly, we can also compute
the cost H(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) where only one selfish user has re-
routed from the suggested path configuration, given by
H(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) (28)
=
∑
σ˜µ∗,σµ∗,I∗
p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗)(|I∗ − σµ∗|+ |σ˜µ∗|)γ
Based on expressions (27) and (28), we can compute the
fractional change in cost, i.e. ∆H(γr, γ) given by Eq. (9),
for the system where there is only one re-routed vehicle.
3. The cost of re-routing multiple selfish users
To examine scenarios with multiple selfish users, one
has to consider all permutations of choosing t selfish users
out of the n users per link with re-routing probability p,
which adheres to the Binomial distribution
B(n, p, t) =
(
n
t
)
pt(1− p)n−t, (29)
with
(
n
t
)
= n!/t!(n − t)! being the Binomial coefficient.
We then denote P (I˜∗|I∗) to be the probability of having
a traffic I˜∗ on a link after selfish re-routing, given its
original traffic I∗. To facilitate the derivation, we define
m˜∗s to be the number of selfish users on a link after all
selfish users in the system have re-routed their original
recommended routes, and instead of P (I˜∗|I∗), we first
write an expression for the probability P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗) that
depends on the number of rerouting decisions, given by
P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗) =
min(Mfs,I
∗)∑
ms=max(0,Mfs−(M−I∗))
(
Mfs
ms
)(
M(1−fs)
I∗−ms
)(
M
I∗
)
×
ms∑
r=0
B
(
ms, r,
p(0, 1, I∗)
p(0, 1, I∗) + p(1, 1, I∗)
)
×
Mfs−ms∑
s=0
B
(
Mfs −ms, s, p(1, 0, I
∗)
p(1, 0, I∗) + p(0, 0, I∗)
)
× δI˜∗,I∗+(s−r)δm˜∗s ,ms−r+s. (30)
6All combinations of route changes are weighed with the
appropriate combinatorial factor, with respect to the
number of route-changes given the number of selfish
users, and the probability of the Bernoulli distribution
reflects the probability of changing route choices on a
link.
With P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗) computed, the probability P (I˜∗|I∗)
is given by marginalizing over m˜∗s
P (I˜∗|I∗) =
Mfs∑
m˜∗s=0
P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗) . (31)
Having obtained P (I˜∗|I∗), we can compute the global
social travel cost H(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) after re-routing, given by
H(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) =
∑
I˜∗
|I˜∗|γ
∑
I∗
P (I˜∗|I∗)P (I∗). (32)
Using Eq. (30) we can compute our main quantity of
interest, i.e. the fractional change ∆H(γr, γ) in the social
cost given by Eq. (9). To the impact specifically on selfish
and compliant users we compute the travel cost averaged
over the selfish users
Hselfish(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) = 1
Mfs
∑
I˜∗,m˜∗s
m˜∗s|I˜∗|γ−1
×
∑
I∗
P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗)P (I∗) , (33)
and the travel cost averaged over compliant users
Hcompliant(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) = 1
M(1− fs)
∑
I˜∗,m˜∗s
(I˜∗ − m˜∗s)|I˜∗|γ−1
×
∑
I∗
P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗)P (I∗) . (34)
We note that the sum of the cost of the selfish and the
compliant users is the total cost of the system after re-
routing, i.e. MfsHselfish + M(1 − fs)Hcompliant = MH.
We can then define the fractional changes ∆Hselfish(γr, γ)
and ∆Hcompliant(γr, γ) for selfish and compliant users re-
spectively, similar to ∆H(γr, γ) in Eq. (9).
4. Effect of distance from the universal destination
We remark that the calculation in Sec. III B 3 and the
resulting probability P (I˜∗|I∗) in Eq. (31) do not consider
the heterogeneity of links in the network. For instance, a
link with an original traffic I∗ = 0 would be more likely to
have I˜∗ > 0 after re-routing if it is closer to the common
destination. To improve the equations of Sec. III B 3 we
incorporate the distance between the link of interest and
the common destination within the derivation.
We define di to be the minimum distance between node
i and the common destination; with di = 0 implying
that node i is the common destination. We then modify
Eqs. (19) and (21), replacing the cavity energy functions
Ei→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il ) and E˜i→l(σ˜
µ
il, σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il ) by the modified cav-
ity functions Ei→l(σ
µ
il, I
\µ
il |di) and E˜i→l(σ˜µil, σµil, I\µil |di),
respectively, which incorporate a given distance to desti-
nation di. In the modified Eqs. (19) and (21), we update
the variable di by
di = 1 + min
j∈Ni\l
{dj} (35)
Next, we modify Eq. (25) to compute the re-routing prob-
ability p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗|d) given the minimum distance d to
the common destination,
d = min(d1, d2), (36)
where d1 and d2 correspond to the distance variables of
E1, E˜1 and E2, E˜2 respectively in Eq. (25).
Using p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗|d), we modify Eq. (30) to obtain
P (I˜∗, m˜∗s|I∗, d) and consequently P (I˜∗|I∗, d). The cost
of the system after re-routing is thus given by
H(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) =
∑
I˜∗
|I˜∗|γ
∑
I∗,d
P (I˜∗|I∗, d)P (I∗, d), (37)
where the joint probability P (I∗, d) is obtained from the
modified Eq. (25). Moreover, the travel cost averaged
over the selfish users is given by
Hselfish(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) = 1
Mfs
∑
I˜∗,m˜∗s
m˜∗s|I˜∗|γ−1
×
∑
I∗,d
P (I˜∗,m˜∗s|I∗,d)P (I∗,d), (38)
and the travel cost averaged over the compliant users is
Hcompliant(σ˜∗(γr)|γ) = 1
M(1−fs)
∑
I˜∗,m˜∗s
(I˜∗−m˜∗s)|I˜∗|γ−1
×
∑
I∗,d
P (I˜∗,m˜∗s|I∗,d)P (I∗,d) . (39)
With both costs computed, we can examine whether var-
ious groups of users, i.e. users on average, selfish or com-
pliant users, benefit after the selfish re-routing.
IV. RESULTS
As mentioned in Sec. II, we mainly study two scenarios:
(i) (γr, γ) = (1, 2) and (ii) (γr, γ) = (2, 2). The analyt-
ical results we obtained by the mean-field approach of
Sec. III B 4 which considers the distance from the com-
mon destination are compared with simulation results,
and the results from a semi-analytical approach in which
the re-routing probabilities p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗|d) are obtained
from simulations instead of Eq. (25); the empirical prob-
abilities are then inserted in the subsequent equations
7for the computation of the system’s behavior. In gen-
eral, the analytical and semi-analytical approaches ex-
hibit very similar results, suggesting that the re-routing
probabilities p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗|d) are estimated accurately in
the analysis.
A. Recommended shortest path - (γr, γ) = (1, 2)
We first examine the case of (γr, γ) = (1, 2), in which
all users are originally recommended to follow their short-
est paths, but the social cost is quadratic in traffic flow
and consequently the individual cost incurs traffic flow
cost linearly along its route. This scenario may corre-
spond to an ordinary daily route choices without coordi-
nation, in which users just follow their shortest path but
some may change their route after getting prior informa-
tion about traffic loads.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), for the cases of α = M/N =
0.1, 0.5 and 0.9, the results from all the three approaches
show that ∆H(1, 2), the fractional change in the social
travel cost averaged over all users, first becomes nega-
tive and then increases back to a positive value as fs
increases. This implies that when users originally follow
their shortest path, a small fraction of selfish users is
beneficial to the system as they occupy less-used roads
freeing up heavily used roads, consequently ∆H becomes
negative. However, the system’s cost increases when the
fraction of selfish users increases, as they correlatively
occupy the previously less-used roads, leading to conges-
tion. Although the analytical results capture the neg-
ative and positive regime as well as the trends of the
simulation results, there are discrepancies. We believe
that the discrepancies come from the mean-field nature
of Eq. (30), since the analytical and semi-analytical re-
sults show a good agreement which suggests that the
analytical approach estimates well the re-routing prob-
abilities p(σ˜µ∗, σµ∗, I∗|d) in simulations. The reason is
arguably the high variability of costs and congestion lev-
els that emerge from the randomness of both topology
and travel start points, which the mean-field approach
does not capture well.
In addition, we see in Fig. 2(a) that the lower the vehi-
cle density α, the larger the value of fs beyond which ∆H
becomes positive. To better reveal the benefits brought
by the selfish re-routing, we show in Fig. 3(a) the param-
eter regime in terms of α and fs in which the system gains
(i.e. ∆H < 0) after the selfish users re-routed. As we can
see, as α increases, the regime with ∆H < 0 decreases,
implying that a suitable fraction of selfish users is bene-
ficial to the system if all users originally just follow their
shortest path. Similar to Fig. 2(a), the analytical and the
semi-analytical results capture the trend in the simula-
tion results, but show discrepancies. These results imply
that although the analytical approaches do not identify
the exact regime boundary in the case of (γr, γ) = (1, 2),
they predict the correct picture.
Next, we examine the change in travel cost over the
selfish and compliant user groups. As shown in Fig. 2(b),
we see that ∆Hselfish, the fractional change in cost for
the selfish users, increases from a negative to a positive
value when fs increases. The smaller the fraction of self-
ish users is the more negative the value of ∆Hselfish is,
suggesting that fewer selfish users gain more from the re-
routing as they can better exploit less-used roads; this
benefit vanishes when as the number of selfish users in-
creases since their correlated re-routings generate con-
gestion on the selected roads. As shown in Fig. 3(b), the
critical fraction of selfish users beyond which they start
to lose decreases as the vehicle density α increases. More
interestingly, Fig. 2(c) shows that the compliant users al-
ways gain for every fs > 0, implying that the presence of
selfish users is beneficial to compliant users which follow
their shortest paths.
B. Quadratic loss optimization - (γr, γ) = (2, 2)
In the case with (γr, γ) = (2, 2), users are recom-
mended to follow the optimal configuration of paths
which already minimizes the social cost, hence selfish re-
routing is likely to increase it. As shown in Fig. 2(d), the
results from all the three approaches show that ∆H > 0
for all fs > 0 as expected, and the more the selfish
users there are, the larger the cost. On the other hand,
we also see that the results obtained from the analytic
and the semi-analytic approaches show a good agreement
with simulation results, better than that in the case of
(γr, γ) = (1, 2) in Fig. 2(a). This is arguably since in
the optimized social cost case, traffic load is already bal-
anced, in spite of the inherent variability induces by the
randomness in topology and route starting points, and
therefore the mean-field approach represents better the
true localized and individualized fields, and probabilities.
Interestingly, although any changes must be detrimen-
tal to the system’s cost, selfish users may gain in their
individual cost as shown in Fig. 2(e) at the expense of
others. As we can see, when vehicle density α is small,
∆Hselfish < 0 when the fraction of selfish users is small,
and ∆Hselfish becomes positive when fs increases. This
reflects the ability of a small fraction of users to exploit
less-used routes selfishly, a strategy that backfires as their
fraction increases, leading to correlations and congestion.
We further show in Fig. 3(c) the parameter regime
within which selfish users gain, defined as the critical
fraction of selfish users fs for a given vehicle density α.
This fraction fs decreases as α increases, implying that
a smaller fraction of selfish users can gain when the ve-
hicle density increases. The regime where ∆Hselfish < 0
in the case of (γr, γ) = (2, 2) shown in Fig. 3(c), is much
smaller than that of the case (γr, γ) = (1, 2) shown in
Fig. 3(b), implying that less selfish users can gain in an
initially-optimized system (γr = 2) compared to the un-
coordinated system (γr = 1). This is in agreement with
the previous results, since the variability of route loads
in the un-coordinated routing allows for selfish users to
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FIG. 2: The fractional change in travel costs (a) ∆H, (b) ∆Hselfish and (c) ∆Hcompliant as a function of fs, averaged over all
users, selfish and compliant users, respectively, for (γr, γ) = (1, 2). The corresponding results for cases with (γr, γ) = (2, 2) are
shown in (d), (e) and (f). The simulation results are obtained on random regular graphs with N = 100 and k = 3 for vehicle
density α = M/N = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 averaged over 1000 realizations. The analytical and semi-analytical results are also shown.
secure improved re-routing. On the other hand, as shown
in Fig. 2(f), compliant users always lose due to the ac-
tions of selfish users, unlike the case of γr = 1, but not
as much in most fs and α values.
In summary, in cases where users are recommended to
follow paths which already minimize the social cost, re-
routing by the selfish users results in a higher social cost,
increases the cost for compliant users, but selfish users
themselves may gain if they are a small minority.
C. Multiple rounds of selfish re-routing and Nash
equilibrium
The results of sections IV A and IV B show that selfish
users may benefit the transportation system after one
round of re-routing. We go on to examine the impact
on the system after multiple rounds of selfish re-routing
via simulations. Both scenarios of (γr, γ) = (1, 2) and
(2, 2) will be examined. At time t = 0, all users follow
their recommended routes, which are either the shortest
path to the common destination (γr = 1) or the path-
configuration which minimizes the social cost (γr = 2).
Then, at each time t ≥ 1, a fraction fs of the users are
randomly selected and re-routed to a path that minimizes
their own individual cost, based on traffic conditions at
t−1.
We find that for small fs the path configuration con-
verges quickly after a few iterations of selfish re-routing,
similar to the example shown in Fig. 4(a), (b) and (c)
with fs = 0.5. No vehicle switches their path in subse-
quent rounds of re-routing since all of them are already
in a path with the minimal individual cost; the system
is effectively in a Nash equilibrium state. On the other
hand, when fs is large, the path configuration may fluc-
tuate repeatedly or run into a limit cycle in the syn-
chronous update schedule, for instance, in the case of
daily commuters departing at the same time. An exam-
ple is shown in Fig. 4(a), (d) and (e) with fs = 1. In this
example, users follow their shortest path at time t = 0.
At t = 1, most users re-route to a path which is rela-
tively un-occupied at t = 0, leaving the originally busy
routes at t = 0 less used at t = 1. At time t = 2, these
users switch back to the less occupied links at t = 1, and
repeatedly switch back and forth between the occupied
and un-occupied routes.
To better understand the convergence and alternating
re-routing behavior, we show in Fig. 5 time series of the
social costH for exemplar instances. In Fig. 5(a) we show
a low vehicle density case α = 0.1 where H converges in
instances with fs = 0.1 and 0.5 where (γr, γ) = (1, 2),
and for all three instances with fs = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 in
the case with (γr, γ) = (2, 2). To reveal the convergence
across instances, we show in Fig. 5(c) the fraction of in-
stances with no change in cost for the final consecutive
2500 steps in simulation totaling 5000 steps. Almost all
90.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
 α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f s
Analytic
Semi-Analytic
Simulations
II: ∆H < 0   (Gain)
I: ∆H > 0   (Loss)
(γ
r
,γ)=(1,2)
(a)
I
II
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f s II: ∆Hselfish < 0   (Gain)
I: ∆H
selfish > 0   (Loss)
(γ
r
,γ)=(1,2)
(b)
I
II
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
 α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f s II: ∆Hselfish < 0   (Gain)
I: ∆H
selfish > 0   (Loss)
(γ
r
,γ)=(2,2)
(c)
II
I
FIG. 3: The regimes with negative or positive (a) ∆H(1, 2),
(b) ∆Hselfish(1, 2) and (c) ∆Hselfish(2, 2) are shown in terms
of the fraction of selfish users fs and vehicle density α. The
predictions of the corresponding regime boundary by the an-
alytical and semi-analytical approaches are shown.
instances converge except those with a large fraction of
selfish users fs = 0.9 in the case of (γr, γ) = (1, 2). This
is possibly due to the large number of synchronous up-
dates. An example of the time series of H in this case is
shown in Fig. 5(a), where H fluctuates vigorously at high
values; this case may share similarity with the example
(a)
Initial condition:
t = 0
(b) (c)
fs = 0.5 :
t = 1
fs = 0.5 :
converged at t = 9
(d) (e)
fs = 1 :
t = 1, 3, 5, · · ·
fs = 1 :
t = 2, 4, 6, · · ·
FIG. 4: An example of consecutive rounds of selfish re-
routing by M = 14 users on a network with N = 30 nodes.
The origins of users and their common destination are shown
by the filled circles and triangle, respectively. Links with non-
zero traffic are shown in green, with width proportional to the
size of the flow. (a) All users travel via their shortest path to
the destination at t = 0. (b) Half of the users re-route at t = 1
i.e. fs = 0.5. (c) The system arrives at a Nash equilibrium
state at t = 9. (d) All users re-route to minimize their own
cost at t = 1, i.e. fs = 1; as we can see, some links close to the
destination have low or zero traffic flow. (e) At t = 2, selfish
users switch to what were less occupied links at t = 1, leaving
other links underloaded. The system then switches back and
forth between the configurations in (d) and (e) repeatedly.
shown in Fig. 4(a), (d) and (e). These results suggest
that at low vehicle density α, most cases of the system
arrive at a Nash equilibrium via selfish re-routing, as ex-
pected.
For cases with a high vehicle density α = 0.9, we show
the time series of H from several instances in Fig. 5(b).
The time series of H for the instances with fs = 0.5 and
0.9 and (γr, γ) = (1, 2) exhibit fluctuations that become
more vigorous compared to the corresponding instances
in Fig. 5(a). As we can see in Fig. 5(d), while most in-
stances still converge for cases with (γr, γ) = (2, 2), the
convergence ratio starts to drop rapidly beyond fs = 0.1
for the case with (γr, γ) = (1, 2). These results suggest
that with a high vehicle density α, it is more difficult for
the system to converge to a Nash equilibrium via selfish
re-routing, especially if users start from the shortest path
configuration. It also suggests that initial route coordina-
tion (i.e. γr = 2) plays a role in facilitating convergence.
To further examine the system state after multi-
ple rounds of selfish re-routing, we measure the time-
averaged social cost 〈H〉t = 1100
∑200
t=101H(σt|γ) and de-
fine a quantity ψ given by
ψ =
〈H〉t −H(σ∗(γ)|γ)
H(σ∗(γ)|γ) , (40)
to compare the time-averaged cost after multiple rounds
of selfish re-routing with the optimal social cost. As
shown in Fig. 6, ψ behaves similarly with respect to fs
and α for both cases of γr = 1, 2, while the values of ψ
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FIG. 5: (a, b) The social travel cost H as a function of t,
the number of selfish re-routing rounds, measured on specific
instances of random regular graphs with N = 100, k = 3,
γr = 1, 2 and various fs for (a) α = 0.1 and (b) α = 0.9. (c,
d) The fraction of instances which show no change in travel
cost H for the last consecutive 2500 steps in a simulation with
5000 steps, for (c) α = 0.1 and (d) α = 0.9.
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FIG. 6: The fractional difference ψ between the cost after
multiple rounds of selfish re-routing and the optimal cost,
as a function of α and fs for (a) (γr, γ) = (1, 2) and (b)
(γr, γ) = (2, 2), respectively. The smaller the value of ψ, the
closer the system’s final state to the optimum. Simulation
results are obtained on random regular graphs with N = 100
and k = 3 over 1000 realizations.
are larger for γr = 1. In both cases, ψ increases gradu-
ally with α and fs from ψ ≈ 0, which suggest that the
system reaches a Nash equilibrium state close to the op-
timal state for systems with a small vehicle density and
a small fraction of selfish users, regardless of the initial
state of the system. On the other hand, largely sub-
optimal states are obtained if the fraction of selfish users
is large.
D. Selfish routing on the England highway network
To reveal the impact of selfish re-routing on realistic
transportation network, we simulate our model on the
England highway network with 395 nodes, each repre-
senting a starting or ending highway junction based on
the data in [19]. As shown in Fig. 7(a), for simplicity,
we create a node in the location of London to serve as
the common destination, and allocate an identical weight
on all links. An example of shortest path configuration
on this highway network with M = 11 users is shown in
Fig. 7(b); the path configuration after all the 11 users
re-routed is shown in Fig. 7(c).
In Fig. 8, we show ∆H, ∆Hselfish and ∆Hcompliant, i.e.
the change in cost averaged over all users, selfish users
and compliant users, respectively, after one round of re-
routing with 500 realizations of simulations. The cor-
responding parameter regimes when all and selfish users
gain are shown in Fig. 9. Remarkably, although the topo-
logical characteristics of the highway network are differ-
ent from those in random regular graphs, the results ob-
tained on the England highway network are similar to
those observed in random regular graphs and predicted
by the theory, as shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for both
cases of (γr, γ) = (1, 2) and (2, 2). It also implies that al-
though the analytical results in Sec. III are derived based
on tree topologies, they capture qualitatively the impact
of selfish route decisions on real transportation networks.
We also show simulation results of multiple rounds of
selfish re-routing on the highway network in Fig. 10 and
Fig. 11. Remarkably, these results are also similar to
those observed in random regular graphs in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6, validating the efficacy of our approach. Neverthe-
less, as we can see in Fig. 10, that the specific topology
makes it more difficult for repetitive selfish-routing to
converge as more instances show a fluctuating H value.
In Fig. 11, we see that ψ increases with fs and α in both
cases of γr = 1, 2, suggesting a small vehicle density and
a small fraction of selfish users would lead the system
to a close-to-optimal Nash equilibria, similar to that ob-
served in random regular graphs. The above results also
suggest that the qualitative behaviors of selfish re-routing
are robust against network topologies.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied a model of transportation networks in
which optimized routes are recommended to users from
their starting point to a common target destination, say
a city center. However, having the global routing sug-
gestion some users choose alternative routes to minimize
their individual costs based on the traffic experienced.
The cavity approach developed in the studies of spin
glasses is employed to analyze the impact caused by the
11
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FIG. 7: (a) The region of UK highway network used in our simulation is enclosed by the red rectangle. The network consists of
395 nodes, each of which represents the starting or the ending junction of roads. (b) An example of the configuration of traffic
flow resulted from M = 11 users traveling on the shortest paths from their origin (red filled circles) to the common destination
in London (the blue triangle). (c) The configuration of traffic flow after all users re-route. As we can see, all users switch to
the initially less occupied route, leaving their original occupied route empty.
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FIG. 8: The fractional changes (a) ∆H, (b) ∆Hselfish and (c) ∆Hcompliant of the travel cost averaged over all users, selfish
and compliant users, respectively; simulations were carried out for 500 realizations on the England highway network with
(γr, γ) = (1, 2) and vehicle densities α = M/N = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. The corresponding simulation results for cases with
(γr, γ) = (2, 2) are shown in (d), (e) and (f).
selfish re-routing behavior, for all users as well as sepa-
rately for the groups of compliant and selfish users.
As shown by both analytical and simulation results, in
the case of un-coordinated transportation networks with
users following their shortest path, a small fraction of self-
ish users may reduce the average cost per vehicle globally
and hence benefit the system. Their selfish re-routings
exploit less-loaded routes, which emerge due to the ran-
domness in both topology and starting points, freeing
up overloaded routes. Nevertheless, when the fraction of
selfish users increases, the average cost per users increase
and the system suffers due to correlation and congestion
that appear due to selfish re-routing. Interestingly, the
average cost for compliant users which do not alter their
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FIG. 9: The regimes with negative or positive (a) ∆H(1, 2),
(b) ∆Hselfish(1, 2) and (c) ∆Hselfish(2, 2) in the simulations
on the England highway network are shown in terms of the
fraction of selfish users fs and vehicle density α.
routes always reduces by the action of selfish users. On
the other hand, in the case of optimized transportation
networks with quadratic costs, selfish re-routing increases
the average cost for all users as well as for compliant
users, as expected. Selfish users themselves may gain if
their fraction in the user population is small, but will lose
out as it grows.
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FIG. 10: The social travel cost H on the England highway
network as a function of t, the rounds of selfish re-routing,
measured on specific instances with γr = 1, 2 and various fs
values for (a) α = 0.1 and (b) α = 0.9.
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FIG. 11: The fractional difference ψ between the cost after
multiple rounds of selfish re-routing and the optimal cost on
the England highway network, as a function of α and fs for
(a) (γr, γ) = (1, 2) and (b) (γr, γ) = (2, 2) respectively. The
simulation results are obtained over 500 realizations.
Using numerical simulations, we show that Nash equi-
libria states may result after multiple rounds of selfish
re-routing, where users no longer re-route once they have
all minimized their costs. The social travel cost per ve-
hicle at the Nash equilibria is close to the value at the
optimal states when the vehicle density and the fraction
of selfish users are small. Similar results are observed on
the simulations on the England highway network.
Our results reveal the impact of selfish routing de-
cisions on the performance of transportation networks,
which shed light on benefit brought by route coordina-
tion and the importance of influencing drivers’ behaviors.
The model can accommodate more realistic costs and ad-
ditional factors to make it more realistic and helpful for
transport engineers. Our work also demonstrates how
the cavity method can be used to study game-theoretical
problems by accommodating the responses of players.
This generalized theoretical framework can be readily
adapted to study other problems based on iterative alter-
ations by network participants in response to the state
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of the system.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the Research Grants Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
(Projects No. EdUHK ECS 28300215, GRF 18304316,
GRF 18301217 and GRF 18301119), the EdUHK FLASS
Dean’s Research Fund IRS12 2019 04418, ROP14 2019
04396, and EdUHK RDO Internal Research Grant RG67
2018-2019R R4015. DS acknowledges support from
the Leverhulme trust (RPG-2018-092) and the EP-
SRC Programme Grant TRANSNET (EP/R035342/1).
DS would like to thank Alfredo Braunstein and Luca
Dall’Asta for helpful discussions at early stages of this
work.
[1] D. Schrank, B. Eisele, and T. Lomax, 2019 Urban Mobil-
ity Report, https://mobility.tamu.edu/umr/report/,
2019.
[2] P. J. Landrigan et al., The Lancet 391, 462 (2018).
[3] M. J. Mogridge, Transport Policy 4, 5 (1997).
[4] X. Ge, Z. Li, and S. Li, IEEE Communications Magazine
55, 87 (2017).
[5] C. Urmson et al., IEEE Intelligent Systems 23, 66 (2008).
[6] J. D. Noh and H. Rieger, Phys. Rev. E 66, 066127 (2002).
[7] R. Dobrin and P. M. Duxbury, Physical Review Letters
86, 5076 (2001).
[8] M. Bayati et al., Physical Review Letters 101, 037208
(2008).
[9] C. H. Yeung and D. Saad, Physical Review Letters 108,
208701 (2012).
[10] C. H. Yeung, D. Saad, and K. M. Wong, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 110, 13717 (2013).
[11] C. H. Yeung, Physical Review E 99, 042123 (2019).
[12] Y. Shiftan, S. Bekhor, and G. Albert, IET Intelligent
Transport Systems 5, 183 (2011).
[13] C. G. Prato, Journal of Choice Modelling 2, 65 (2009).
[14] S. Fischer and B. Vo¨cking, in European Symposium on
Algorithms (Springer, Berlin, 2004), pp. 323–334.
[15] E. Anshelevich and S. Ukkusuri, in International Sym-
posium on Algorithmic Game Theory (Springer, Berlin,
2009), pp. 171–182.
[16] R. Cole, Y. Dodis, and T. Roughgarden, Journal of Com-
puter and System Sciences 72, 444 (2006).
[17] J. R. Correa, A. S. Schulz, and N. E. Stier-Moses, Math-
ematics of Operations Research 29, 961 (2004).
[18] M. Me´zard, G. Parisi, and M. Virasoro, Spin glass theory
and beyond: An Introduction to the Replica Method and
Its Applications (World Scientific Publishing Company,
Singapore, 1987), Vol. 9.
[19] Highways Agency network journey time and traffic flow
data, 2018, https://data.gov.uk/dataset/.
